Kokoda History

The history of the Kokoda Track during 1942 is nothing short of amazing. The stories of individual efforts, of triumph and defeat are ones that are still helping to shape Australia’s identity.

While the actual events along the Track will enthrall all who walk it and paint a vivid picture for our generation, it is the stories behind the events, the motivations for action and inaction, on both sides of the conflict that provides the glue that brings all the events together and gives them some sort of sense. For an event without a context will be an event lost to history.

On this page, we will examine what led up to the war, what motivated Japan to join it and what were they thinking coming to PNG. I will also examine what had happened to Australia’s armed forces before the war, why we were in such a precarious position and what was our state of mind as a nation during the war.

Once we have examined these things we will then go through events along the Track, particular battles and examine the motivations and goals behind these. We will highlight events and occasions away from the Track that would affect events on it. It is through this examination, that you will be able to piece all the Kokoda stories together as a coherent and extremely interesting and exciting story.

Australia Between Wars
Economic good times followed the Great War, with massive technological and communications leaps and an amassing of material wealth the young Australian nation had never seen before. The golden twenties not only heralded a time of wealth but also an international ideology of pacifism and as a consequence, disarmament. Why wouldn’t they. Europe had just gone through the Great War, the war to end all wars. They were weary from battle and believed there was a better way.

It was during this period that the armament gap between the western powers and their would-be antagonists narrowed. Prime Minister Hughes put nearly half of the Navies ships out of commission, reduced the militia to 25% of its former self, diminished the permanent army by discharging 72 officers.

Coinciding with this down grade of forces, was the British rationalization of its own forces. A 40% cut in military spending saw the British reduce its Pacific presence, namely around Fortress Singapore. Coupled with a vulnerability to an attack from its landward side and a population that were neither trained nor skilled to furnish a proper remote base, Singapore became a disaster waiting to happen.

While Australian Governments watched Germany and Japan expanding within their own spheres of influence, they continued to place full faith in British naval and air power, Fortress Singapore and British diplomacy of appeasement. By 1939, it was apparent appeasement was not going to work on the Germans and the Japanese were not about to slow their Great Asian ambitions either.

In the 1930’s, the reduced armed forces in the West, was handed a second blow by something as powerful as the pacifist ideology, The Great Depression. Mass unemployment, bankruptcy, poverty and a general diminishing of economic indicators, left governments powerless to expand the military, as taxes were better spent elsewhere.

Japan And Why They Went To War
League of Nations and Racial Equality
Japan was on the Allied side in World War I, though it hadn’t done much fighting. In fact Japan had transported Australian troops to Europe. The Japanese had three goals for the Paris Peace Conference after the war:
-to get a clause on racial equality written into the covenant of the League of Nations,
-to control the north Pacific islands (the Marshalls, the Marianas and the Carolines), and
-to keep the German concessions in Shantung, China.

In the end, they got 2 out of their 3 aims. It says something about the major powers of the time that they didn’t get the most legitimate of their goals.

The racial equality clause was born out of the discrimination and humiliation that the Japanese faced in the West. When the Japanese made their intentions known about introducing this clause, the most vehement opposition came from Australia, which was part of the British empire delegation. Here is the British Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour about the clause:
“The notion that all men were created equal was an interesting one, he found, but he did not believe it. You could scarcely say that a man in Central Africa was equal to a European.”

It was an issue that was very popular in Japan and very unpopular in the western states of the US. President Wilson wasn’t exactly an enlightened person when it came to race. An example of US conduct is that African American troops were put under French command for the Great War.

The greatest opposition, however, was from Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes who was mortified about the future of “White Australia” if the clause was accepted. He refused all compromise attempts by the US delegate Edward House. The Prime Minister of New Zealand, William Massey, agreed with Hughes. After British efforts to reach a compromise, Hughes put a condition that he might accept the racial equality clause if it had a proviso exempting national immigration policies. The Japanese balked at that.

Finally, the Japanese delegation introduced a watered-down version which simply asked for “the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals.”
Delegates from Greece, Italy, China, France and Czechoslovakia spoke in favor of the Japanese amendment to the League Covenant. The British delegation opposed it. US President Woodrow Wilson was worried that the League of Nations Covenant might not get the support of US senators from the western states if it included the racial equality provision. (Remember that the western states had put in a lot of restrictions on Japanese immigrants at the time.) He asked the Japanese to withdraw their amendment, but the Japanese insisted on a vote.

What do you think happened next? Well, the majority of the delegates voted for the Japanese amendment. But Wilson announced that the amendment could not carry because there were strong objections to it.

As a result, the Japanese threatened to not sign the peace treaty. That threat played some part in getting Japan the Shantung area that it had captured from Germany.

Japan Signs Pact With Germany
Between the wars, Japan and Russia became enemies, with the Japanese navy delivering the first ever Asian naval blow on a western power. Germany signed a treaty with Japan to offer protection against the growing and industrializing Russia that appeared in the thirties. It gave Japan increased access to the German economy (the largest in the west at that time and the fastest growing while the rest of the Western world fell into depression in the 30’s) and an additional threat to counter Russian interest in Manchuria. Japan had no interest in a European war and never intended to honor the treaty to attack German enemies except Russia and then only in the East. The treaty gave Germany another threat against the Russians in case war happened with them. Germany was afraid of the extremely rapid economic growth of the new Soviet empire. It promised to be twice the size of the German economy within five years, ten at the most.

At the time these treaties were signed, Hitler was still the darling of the Capitalist world because he was opposed to Communism and the Soviet Union. Hitler at this time was also the biggest supporter for the creation of a Jewish state on the English controlled Palestine. This support existed from 1928 through to 1940.
Japan finally invaded China in 1931, without declaration of war, when Japan unilaterally annexed Manchuria, i.e. northern China. They then continued with the annexation of the large province of Jehol in 1934. In 1937, Japan launched a full scale invasion into the remaining China.

Japan Lacks Resources and Has Grand Plans For Asia
Lack of resources due to American trade restrictions left the Japanese with two choices: either end expansionism or go to war with America. At the time the U.S was supplying Japan with Oil and scrap metal, both of which were being used to fight the war in China. The U.S placed an embargo on trade with Japan and demanded their withdrawal from China. Do bare in mind the Japanese had no way of paying reparations to China demanded by the Americans in return for normal trade to resume. While I agree with the American stance against Japan it was still the reason for the attack on Pearl Harbour, basically it would not have happened if those restrictions hadn't been imposed.

One must also bare in mind, that Western powers controlled most Asian territories and thus could exert even more pressure on Japan’s economy by preventing goods to be delivered from the colonies.

War Breaks Out
In September 1939, Germany invades Poland. With Britain declaring war on Germany, so too, Australia was dragged back into another European war. However, unlike the First World War where Japan was an ally, now Japan was expanding and was a signatory with Germany.

Australia’s meager armed forces were not ready for an overseas expedition. The Government was loathed to use conscription for overseas service, so they were forced to establish a two army system, one used to fight for the Empire overseas (the AIF Australian Infantry Force) and one to defend Australian territory (the Militia). This two army system would dog the government and the Army for the entirety of the war. The powers that be believed that they had avoided the controversy that conscription for an overseas expeditionary force would have created.

By 1941, the AIF had committed the 6th, 7th and 9th Divisions to the Middle East (approx 30000 men). All that remained in Australia was the 8th Division and the Militia. (There were other Divisions but they were undermanned, under-trained and under-equipped). To make matters worse, remnants of the 8th Division were divvied up to places like Rabaul, Timor and Ambon not allowing for any sort of concentration of power.

Initially the 49th Battalion (approx 850 men) from Queensland was the first unit sent to Port Moresby in March 1941. By July 1941, this Battalion was ranked the worst battalion in Australia. No reconnaissance was done on the Kokoda Track for the next 12 months even though the clouds of war were on the door of the Pacific.
In later 1941, it was deemed that PNG needed to be reinforced to a Brigade strength, so the 53rd Battalion from NSW and the 39th Battalion from Victoria were sent. Both Battalions arrived in January 1942.

In December 1941, with growing pressure from the U.S trade embargo, an escalating theatre of war in China, a sense of discrimination from the Western powers in international bodies such as The League of Nations (superseded by the United Nations) and a growing influence of the Armed forces on domestic and international policy, Japan believed the only way they could secure their future was to continue expanding and wipe U.S military and political influence out of the region. Pearl Harbor was bombed, starting the Japanese war machines rampage through S.E Asia.

By February, only 6 weeks after the 30th Militia Brigade 3300 men (made up of the 49th, 53rd and the 39th Battalions) the Japanese had attacked, captured and slaughtered Australian units in Rabaul, bombed Port Moresby, captured Singapore (15 Feb 1942), landed in Timor and invaded Java. PNG was totally vulnerable. The defence of the Australian main land was tantamount. That is why the 7th Division (approx 10000 men) with its great successes in the Middle East was kept in Australia awaiting an imminent Japanese attack. And this is why the 30th Brigade were sent to PNG to be a temporary delay to Japanese attacks but by no means were they considered to stop the Japanese war machine. They were to be lambs to the slaughter.

The 7th Division was sent to PNG eventually. Why? Because for the first time in the Pacific War, the Japanese navy was checked by allied forces in the Battle for the Coral Sea from 6-9 May. Japanese troop carriers and battle ships were heading for Port Moresby but were turned back creating a great delay for the allies. The Battle of Midway (4-6 June) with its Allied victory again reinforced the belief that Japan could be defeated and after this battle the 7th AIF Division was sent to PNG. PNG was now seen as the front line of the war against Japan, not Australia. Brigadier Porter takes control in April 1942 and effectively starts training up inexperienced Militia Battalions. These units still remain poorly trained and poorly equipped and inexperienced.

Why did the Japanese want Port Moresby?
1/ It would protect there right flank (the Dutch East Indies or Indonesia) which had oil fields, tin mines and rubber plantations.
2/ It denied the Allies a strong base to launch attacks against strategic targets such as Rabaul.
3/ It would provide a base suitable to launch bombing missions on Australia, frustrating American attempts to reinforce and strengthen that land.

Japanese land in PNG
Templeton’s B Company (approx 120 men) arrives at Kokoda on the 15 July.
Japanese land at Gona on 21 July 1942.
The Japanese Master Plan was to include overall 13500 seasoned troops some of which were from the crack 5th Sasebo Naval Landing Force. They were well trained, well experienced well equipped with field artillery and mortars and many were big men averaging 6 foot.

Initially only one Company (B Company) from the 39th Militia were sent to Kokoda to delay this Japanese army. This force was known now as Maroubra Force.
11 Platoon first units to battle with Japanese at Kumusi River on the 24th July. At this stage Japanese thought to have 2000 troops at Gona.
Lieutenant Colonel Owen arrives at Kokoda by plane on 25 July and decides to make a stand at Gorari. Returns to Kokoda expecting reinforcements by air.
Japanese attack Gorari with such conviction that all Australian units pushed back to Oivi.
26th July only two flights with 32 men (one Platoon) arrive in Kokoda and reinforce Oivi. D Company which was meant to leave Port Moresby that day, didn’t.
Templeton knew that if Oivi fell:
1/ 10 Platoon which guarded Kokoda would be annihilated
2/ Japanese would be able to advance far down the Track without any opposition
3/ Most importantly, Australian forces would not be able to be quickly reinforced by air (the airstrip would be gone).

Battle at Oivi was at close quarters, many Japanese getting within meters of a 50 meter perimeter. It was during this battle that Sam Templeton disappeared never to be seen again.

The Australians were surrounded and certain defeat and death was imminent, when a Papuan Police Officer, Lance Corporal Sanopa, found a creek that led away through Japanese lines all the way to Deniki. Sanopa saved 2 Platoons from getting wiped out.

The Two Battles For Kokoda Village
Owen, who was waiting for reinforcements in Kokoda was told of the fate of the Australian units at Oivi. In the morning of the 27th July, Owen had to abandon Kokoda with several building left ablaze and headed for Deniki. There he found the remnants of the units from Oivi. Owen had 80 men at his disposal.

Owen was surprised to find out from remnants of the Oivi battle that Kokoda was not taken by the Japanese. While Owen believed that the Track would be easier to defend than Kokoda, the airstrip at Kokoda was key to reinforcements.

By 28th July, Owen had deployed his force around the administration area of Kokoda (which is the tip of the plateau). He radioed back to Port Moresby telling them he had retaken Kokoda and that he was in desperate need of reinforcements and mortars. He also told them the airfield had reopened to Allied aircraft.

Later that day two Douglas transport planes filled with a Platoon of men flew over the airfield. The American pilots would not land as they thought there were Japanese troops nearby. The last realistic chance for reinforcements at Kokoda airfield was lost.
This lack of effort by the high command and the pilots to reinforce Kokoda was put down to:
1/ A belief the Japanese were merely procuring ground for an advanced air base
2/ That the Japanese couldn’t cross the Owen Stanley Ranges anyway because they could be held up at the Kokoda Gap
3/ There was no appreciation of the terrain Owen and his men were fighting under.

This cycle of deficient supplies and reinforcements would plague Maroubra Force until Ioribawa some 2 months later down the Track.

That night, a thick mist settled in the Yodda valley and over Kokoda Village. At 2am on 29 July, the Japanese opened up with mortar and machine gun fire on Australian positions. 30 minutes later the Japanese advanced on the northern tip of the plateau. Owen walked and talked with his men, oblivious to the gun fire around him. He was shot through the head with a single bullet and died. The 39th Battalion had lost their commanding officer and was rapidly loosing the plateau. Close combat continued and confusion reigned as the darkness and thick fog obscured perceptions. Australian forces retreated back to Deniki through the plantations that we still walk through today.
The Battle for the Kokoda Track was about to begin.

For the next week, both the Australians and the dominant Japanese forces consolidated their positions. Why did the Japanese stop? They too, like the Australians, were unsure of the number of their enemy. The commanding officer, Major General Horii, wanted to make sure he had enough force to defeat the Australians completely.
The Australians still had two problems, concentration of force and supply. The problem of supply would continue throughout the campaign, however Lieutenant Kienzle had found the ‘dry lake beds’ of Myola on 3 August, that would later become the location where the biscuit bombers would drop supplies.

The problem of concentration of force also dogged Australian forces for much of the Kokoda campaign. While the rest of the 39th Militia headed for Deniki, they were under trained and they lacked ground sheets, spare clothes, spare boots, spare laces and they had a uniform unfit for jungle warfare.

After the death of Templeton and Owen, the 39th Battalion came under temporary Command of Major Allan Cameron. Cameron had under his command less than 500 men. He arrived in Deniki branding the 39th Battalion cowards and deserters. While a handful of the young Australians from the battle of Kokoda had ‘gone bush’, the men of the 39th didn’t deserve the brand and were very bitter towards their new commanding officer.

Cameron was hell bent on recapturing Kokoda? Why? He believed that the capture would allow for more reinforcements. However, the Australians only had 2 DC 3’s at their disposal. To reinforce to any level that could take it up to the Japanese would have taken days of continual flights, in weather that is volatile to say the least.
Cameron sent out three patrols, one to observe Kokoda, one to observe a traditional path to Kokoda from Deniki and one to find an ambush area on the Kokoda – Oivi Track. The first two patrols found no Japanese movement and the third found an ideal ambush spot.

Based on this information, three units were thus sent out. One to take the airfield traveling along the old native track, one was to ambush the Kokoda – Oivi Track and thus prevent reinforcements and the third was to take Kokoda.

Cameron did not know the whole Japanese operation, their equipment, where they all were, their numbers etc. Thus the attack was doomed from the outset. He knew nothing of the enemy, the goal was pointless and the Australians lacked a concentration of force (all the Companies were spread out).

From 630 am on 8 August, Cameron’s units headed out. A skeleton crew were left back in Deniki and the disparaged B Company (well under 100 men now) were deployed further down the Track at Eora Creek.

C Company that was to head down the main Deniki-Kokoda Track was soon under fire from the main Japanese force that was undetected by Cameron’s reconnaissance the day earlier. They were forced back to Deniki by 8pm that night.

A Company, tasked to take Kokoda surprisingly had no resistance and took Kokoda easily, setting off their flare gun to let those in Deniki they had taken the village. The flare was never seen from Deniki.

D company was sent for the ambush and found themselves pinned down.
The separated Companies didn’t know what was happening to each other. A Company was not going to receive reinforcement from C Company and D Company was pinned down, unable to help. By the 10 August, Kokoda was abandoned and the 39th Battalion was in disarray. All units returned to Deniki.

The Japanese now knew:
1/ That the Kokoda airstrip was vital to Allied supplies
2/ That the Australians could only reinforce over the Owen Stanley Ranges, an 8 day walk
3/ That while the airfield was important to the Australians, they could not sustain a large force to take it and keep it, thus suggesting that the Australians didn’t have a large force in the first place.

The Japanese were also buoyed by the fact that Horii was about to join the Battle with his crack South Seas Detachment.

Maroubra Force on the other hand were a shadow of themselves with very little ammunition and food remaining.

Whatever time Cameron had gained during his fateful attack on Kokoda, he soon lost it at Deniki. The Japanese persisted with their attacks, always attacking the high ground and probing lines for weakness.

By the 13 August, the depleted Australian units pulled back to Isurava. On the 16th, Maroubra Force was taken over by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Honner.
Honner was a School Master turned Lawyer, a veteran of Libya, Greece and Crete. He was well respected by his men and officers.
Honner’s orders were simple:
1/ Assume immediate command of Maroubra Force
2/ Hold the enemy north of the ranges until relieved by the 21st Brigade (approx 3000 men)

The Japanese had three alternatives at Isurava:
1/ Advance along the Eastern side of Eora Creek and bypass Isurava
2/ Attack along the higher ground to the west from Naro and Alola
3/ A direct attack on 39th Battalion at Isurava.
The Japanese decided on the 3rd option.
Honner deployed his troops down the Track at the front creek, along the eastern flank where the Memorial is, to the west along a track that heads up the hill behind the Memorial and at the rear creek.

On the days leading up to the Japanese attack (26 August), Australian units conducted patrols and digging in. The Japanese assembled at the front with Major General Horii, 5 battalions of the South Seas Force, all 3 battalions of the 144th Regiment and 2 battalions from the 41st Regiment. They were accompanied by the 55th Mountain Artillery and engineers units. All in all nearly 6000 men.

26 August
6000 Japanese against 1000 Australians.
On the morning of the 26 August, the Japanese unleashed the full fury of their awesome superiority of numbers and fire power upon the 39th Battalion. Mountain guns, that were man handled along the Track, bombarded the main Isurava positions.
The already depleted 39th Battalion was holding on with grim determination. That afternoon, after a month in the jungle fighting the greatest jungle warfare army ever seen, they were reinforced by the arrival of the 2/14th Battalion and 2/16th battalion AIF from the 21st Brigade 7th Division.

Potts assumed command of Maroubra Force on August 23rd. He was promised the full 21st Brigade including the 2/27th Battalion as well as plenty of supplies at Myola. On the 15th of August he received word that the Japanese had reinforced with 4000 new troops at Gona of which 1800 were seen as combat. Potts however felt that with the promised supplies and command of the 39th Battalion and 53rd Battalion as well as the 21st Brigade, that his forces were up to the task of stopping the Japanese advance and then pushing them back.

However, two disasters struck Pott’s plan.
1/ On the 17th August, the Japanese bombed 2 Dakota transport and 3 Flying Fortresses. A further 5 Dakotas and 5 Fortresses were damaged. The planes were wing tip to wing tip fully laden and fully fuelled. The Dakotas were the ‘biscuit bombers’. Thus Potts only found 5 days of rations not 25 days at Myola.
2/ The 2/27th Battalion (approx 850 men) was held up at Milne Bay thus Potts didn’t have all the forces he was promised.

Thus Potts considered 3 options at Isurava:
1/ Keep the 39th Battalion and 53rd Battalion at the front and the 2/14th Battalion and 2/16th Battalion back at Myola. This would keep his reinforcements concealed and allow for a build up of supplies. It was rejected because of the physical condition of the 39th.
2/ Keep the 39th and 53rd at the front while the 2/14th Battalion and 2/16th Battalion take the east and west flank. This would prevent an outflank and secure the supplies at Myola but the condition of the 39th again ruled this out.
3/ The least attractive option which he was forced to take, was relieve the 39th Battalion with the 2/14th, keep the 53rd Battalion at Alola and bring the 2/16th forward to Alola.

The Two Battle Grounds of Isurava
While the focus remains on Isurava Battlefield, there were in fact 2 theatres of war at this battle. 1/Isurava itself
2/ The eastern slope from Eora Creek along the Missima – Abuari track opposite Alola.

27 August
The 27th August saw the Battle of Isurava erupt in an awesome fury such as not had been witnessed throughout the campaign. The Japanese attacked the main Isurava village as well as along the Missima-Abuari track to outflank the Australian forces.
Wave after wave of Japanese descended on the Australian lines. Wave after wave was repelled in an absolute blood bath.

The 53rd Militia was deployed to cut off the advance along the Missima-Abuari Track. They were routed and forced Potts to send units of the 2/16th Battalion to their rescue.
The 27th was a big day for the Japanese. Horii had the opportunity to wreak havoc on the Australians. He had them pinned down at Isurava and had extended their left flank after routing the 53rd militia.

Horii’s goal was to encircle the Australians and then wipe them out. Why did he stop at Abuari and not continue behind Australia?

1/ Horii may have been unaware how big or small the Australian force was
2/ Horii was faced with poor communication
3/ Horii may not have wanted to over extend his left flank until Isurava fell
Whatever the reason Horii did not take the advantage to wipe the Australians out.

28 August
Bloody battle continues and Horii starts to get frustrated at the delay Isurava is posing. Dysentery and Diarrhea set in to both sides especially the Japanese who have a lower standard of personal hygiene.

29 August
Horii decides to bring in reserves to finally end the battle. The Japanese reinforce the right flank towards Missima and Abuari while the 2/16th Battalion head them off.
Back at Isurava, a titanic struggle continued with the 2/14th Battalion and the 39th Militia Battalion overcoming enormous odds by keeping the Japanese at bay.

It was a day of great heroics and sorrow. It was the day that Butch Bisset was killed and the acts of Charlie McCallum, Allen Avery, Lindsey Bear and the most famous of all Private Kingsbury kept the Australian lines in tact. But not for long.

It was also the day that 27 of the 30 wounded 39th Militia returned to battle knowing their brothers were in trouble.

While the 2/14th Battalion alone had caused over 500 Japanese casualties the Australian forces were depleting and in need of reinforcements.

In the late hours of the 29th, Potts had no other option but to withdraw from Isurava.
The withdrawal however left some units isolated and separated from the main column. One such unit was forced to trek through the trackless jungle for 21 days, 19 of those without food meeting up with the Australian forces at Uberi.

The Push Back
The 2/16th Battalion and a small group of the 53rd Battalion were still tackling with a large Japanese force on the opposite side of the Valley near Abuari. These units prevented the Japanese from cutting the Track off behind the main Australian units of the 39th and the 2/14th Battalion.

At 3pm on 30 August, Potts gave the order to withdraw all the way to Eora Creek as Alola was not a good defensive position.

This was a fighting withdrawal with Japanese and Australians in constant contact. Potts goal now was to keep his units intact knowing that his supply line was shortening and that the 2/27th Battalion and possibly the 25th Brigade would reinforce him.

The 2/14th Battalion took the brunt of the Japanese in the withdrawal. On 28 August it had over 500 men, by 31 August it mustered 160 men, 48 killed in the withdrawal and 44 had been cut off.

Horii now was starting to face his own supply problem The Japanese through arrogance, only supplied themselves with 11 days rations. The delaying tactics of the Australians had pushed this well out. The Australians also destroyed munitions and supplies as they retreated leaving little behind for advancing Japanese units.
From the 31st August until the 15th September, a decisive military game of ‘Cat and Mouse’ was staged along the Track. Potts would not be able to make a stand until Efogi (Brigade Hill).

His tactic was obvious in conception but intricate in execution. Exhausted, sleepless and hungry men were required company by company, platoon by platoon to hurriedly withdraw, stop, prepare positions, defend dourly until their comrades could pass through their line and then within a mere 20-30 meters, break contact with the enemy at dawn, dusk or late at night and trudge wearily up and down muddy hills to repeat the process again and again. To retreat too quick would give the Japanese too quick an acquisition of land and to retreat to slowly would threaten be outflanked.

For 2 days, Eora Creek was held by the Western Australian 2/16th Battalion. Under constant attack, Potts decided to withdraw to Myola, sending units to Kagi to prevent being cut off from the Track completely.

This was not a simple retreat, so on the 3rd September the 2/16th moved back behind the 2/14th’s lines and then later that day the 2/14th moved back past the now dug in 2/16th again.

On the night of the 3rd and early on the 4th September, the 2/14th arrived at Myola. It was by now full stocked with ammunition, fresh clothes, food, beds etc. The men couldn’t believe their eyes. This heaven was short lived as the Japanese continued its pressure on the Australians.

It was also on the 3rd of September that Potts was informed that the 25th Brigade, 7th Division were soon to arrive in Port Moresby. However, as a sign of how out of touch High Command was of the situation on the Track, they implored Potts to hold Myola and even to go on the offensive. This was impossible. He only had 400 men at his disposal.
By the 5th of September Myola was abandoned. All Australian units were to retreat to what would become one of the bloodiest and bitter battles along the Track, known as Butchers Hill, Brigade Hill or Mission Ridge.

Brigade Hill is the ridge line that’s runs south of Efogi. Potts was to finally receive the 2/27th Battalion but by the time they arrived at Brigade Hill they were exhausted from a forced 4 day hike from base area.

Ironically, Brigade Hill would be the first time Potts had full command of all his units, but for a large part he would be distracted by his own personal safety and was thus unable to command them effectively. On top of this they were severely depleted and hardly represented the force they appeared on paper.

At Brigade Hill Potts faced with several problems:
1/ His 2/14th and 2/16th were reduced a mere 400 men
2/ His 2/27th were fatigued
3/ The Australians had no support artillery or heavy machine guns
4/ He only had meager medical support
5/ Continued to be outnumbered 6 to 1

On the 4th September the 39th Militia were finally relieved by the 2/27th’s arrival. At Deniki the 39th Militia had 470. Now at Brigade Hill they had 180 men, half of which were really unfit to fight. Overall the Australians 980 men and were outnumbered 6 to 1.

Overlooking Efogi, the 2/27th Rifle Companies watched as the Japanese war machine walked into the village. Thousands of lanterns trailed down the Track towards Efogi. While Potts could see this movement he could do nothing about it as he had no long range weapons.

So Potts ordered an airstike on Efogi and the Efogi-Myola Track. At 8am on the 7th September the air force made amends for its debacles at Kokoda and Myola, and bombed these positions. 8 Marauder B26s and 4 Kittyhawks starfed and bombed Japanese positins. The air raid raised Australian moral, but it had little impact on the Japanese position.

On the same day Horii continued probing positions both East and West of the ridge line. Most were detected by Australian patrols, but unknown to Potts and his HQ position on Brigade Hill several Japanese units went undetected on their flank. This would be a decisive blunder on behalf of the Australians.

On the 8th September, Horii unleashed his forces on the Australian units, including 1500 fresh reinforcements. A Company of the 27th bore the brunt of the attacks with some eight attacks in one morning being repelled. A Company had used 1200 hand grenades, 100 rounds of ammunition per man and all the reserve ammunition available.
B Company resisted similar attacks. The blood bath that presented itself in front of both A and B Companies was reminiscent of first world war charge tactics along the Western Front.

Potts could hear the battle down the Track. As he visited the latrine with Lance Corporal John Gill from the Guard Patrol, the relative peace of HQ was shattered by a single shot. The Private next to Potts fell to the ground with a bullet in his head. If only the Japanese soldier who shot the Private knew that the other man was Potts, the battle for Brigade Hill may have been even more devastating.

That single shot heralded the climactic struggle for Brigade Hill. Horii had sent out some wide ranging patrols that were undetected by Potts and they were now threatening Australian HQ. The situation was so dire that Potts had instructed Lieutenant Caro to take command if HQ was overrun.

Horii’s frustration at Isurava may now be satisfied. His objectives were:
1/ To attack Australian HQ and cut the command system off at the head
2/ More importantly, to outflank the Australians and cut them off from the Track to the south.
Pott’s was under pressure in every theatre of the battlefield.
1/ His own HQ was under direct attack with the enemy at time only 15m from the perimeter and cut from a large slab of his men
2/ 2/27th on Mission Ridge was now cut off from HQ and the telephone was cut to their position
3/ 2/16th Battalion HQ was also cutoff without water and under heavy Japanese pressure.

Japanese advances towards Brigade HQ were continually repelled.
The combined 2/14th and 2/16th were ordered to attack down the Track towards Pott’s HQ, to break through Japanese lines that were now dug in and secure a continuous Australian line. All 4 Companies incurred severe casualties, including Charlie McCallum who won a Distinguished Conduct Medal at Isurava.

Only approximately 10 got through the line. In desperation Potts ordered his HQ to attack up the Track to breach the Japanese line but this too failed.

By the end of the day of the 8th September, Potts had no other option but to pull back to Menari before even HQ were cut off.

But it was too late for the other Battalions. The Japanese had gained control of the Track behind them. Potts was forced to send his units down the eastern slope towards Menari via an old unused and extremely narrow path.
Battalion Commanders were faced with 3 problems:
1/ Time. All units were cut off and it was only a matter of time before the Japanese headed towards Menari.
2/ The terrain was steep and thickly vegetated. For even fit fresh troops the terrain would be difficult let alone sick, malnourished and tired men.
3/ The wounded slowed everyone and in many cases there were just enough men to carry the wounded leaving no-one available to repel any Japanese attack. 8 men were needed to carry one stretcher 4 to carry and 4 to relieve.

The units would leave Brigade Hill in this order:
1/ 2/16th
2/ 2/14th
3/ Lastly 2/27th as they were furthest from HQ

B and D Companies of the Composite 2/14th and 16th were sent down towards the Japanese line towards Menari to hold them off while the retreat was taking place.
By the 9th September, all units traveled slowly through the jungle, handicapped by the wounded. It was decided that small armed units would press ahead of the wounded and take control of Menari. Just as these forward units of the 2/14th and 2/16th arrived in Menari, the Japanese started their bombardment of the village.

All units of the 2/14 and 2/16 including the wounded had just arrived at Menari when the order for withdrawal was made at 2.30pm that day. The 2/27th had not reached Menari in time and were going to be cut off from the remaining Australian units.
Cooper, who controlled the 2/27th, sent men ahead to ascertain if Menari was safe and to also bolster Potts forces.

When you visit Menari you can see it is vulnerable from attack on all sides. Potts had no choice but to withdrawer even though he knew the 25th Brigade were on the way (remember the 3rd September discussion with Eather), but he had no idea when they would join the battle.

Why didn’t the 2/27th get to Menari in time:
1/ They had further to travel than any other units.
2/ They left last and had to travel more at night than any other unit.
3/ They had more wounded to carry which slowed them down further.

Coopers forward units of the 2/27th found Menari occupied when they arrived. They decided not to attack because:
1/ They didn’t have enough men and would need to attack over open ground
2/ The Japanese forces far outnumbered them
3/ He couldn’t afford anymore wounded as he didn’t have enough men to carry them.

Potts had once again eluded Horii’s attempt to encircle and annihilate. This time however he had lost half his force, with the 2/27th stuck behind enemy lines.

From the 9th to the 22nd of September, the 2/27th had to cut their own way through the PNG jungle to regain Australian lines. They had run out of food on the 9th and relied on native tucker to get them through. They had to carry wounded. The narrowly missed Potts at Menari and again at Nauro a few days later. They finally met up with the 2/14th at Nigabiafa near Iorabawa.

By the 9th of September, Potts had under his control only 300 men and no reliable position to slow the Japanese between Menari and Iorabawa. He was commanding under impossible conditions.

By the 10th of September the Japanese had come close to Nauro (which during the war was just at the base of the Maguli Ranges at the end of the swamp). There were no positions to counterattack or hold off the Japanese up the Maguli Range.

Because of his “failures” at Myola and Brigade Hill, Potts was recalled to Port Moresby, and was replaced by Brigadier Porter and fresh troops from the 3rd Battalion.
It is interesting to note that on his acquisition of command Porter immediately withdrew to Iorobawa (even though he had fresh men). He was faced with the same problems Potts had:
1/ He had to react to the fact that the terrain gave no vantage point to set up defences
2/ He was severely outnumbered.

In the morning of the 11th of September the 2/14th and 2/16th units passed through the 3rd Battalions lines about 45 minutes north of Iorabawa. Australian ambushes continued to reek havoc on Japanese advances.

By the 12th September the now Composite 2/14th and 2/16th as well as the 3rd Battalion set up lines on the spur just north of Iorobawa awaiting the arrival of the 25th Brigade. On this same day the 14th Field Regiment had manhandled 2 x 25 pounder artillery pieces up to Owers Corner (this however had little impact on the final Japanese withdrawal back towards the Nth coast as other factors beyond Kokoda contributed to this : this will be explained later).

Eather arrived with his fresh 25th Brigade to bolster the Iorobawa line. He envisaged that his battle plan run like this:
1/ His 2/33rd Battalion would right flank the Japanese through the 3rd Battalion line.
2/ 2/25th would thrust northwards through the Composite Unit
3/ Left Flank thrust by his 2/31st Battalion.

But it all went wrong.
1/ 2/31st got disorientated and briefly lost,
2/ The inexperienced 3rd Battalion were routed from one of their positions on the high ground. (They were digging weapons pits out of reach from their weapons and with a sentry that wasn’t taking notice.)

The Japanese once again had the high ground and by the 16th of September, Eather found himself in a precarious position. He moved his force back to Imita Ridge.
An interesting point here is that Potts was replaced because High Command thought he wasn’t being effective, being constantly pushed back towards Port Moresby. Here now you have Eather falling back with:
1/ 3 fresh Battalions
2/ A relatively fresh 3rd Battalion
3/ A relatively short supply line
4/ A Japanese force that had a long supply line now, that was fatigued, sick etc

All of Eather’s forces were back at Imita Ridge by the morning of the 17th of September.

High Command had had enough. Imita Ridge was to be their last stand. Their desperation was born out of the previous 4 shocking events that had occurred between July and September that year.

1/ The fall of Isurava. That Kokoda fell was understandable as it was defended by the 39th Militia. But Isurava was defended by the well respected 21st Brigade (minus 1 Battalion) was implausible. In fact they were expected to push the Japanese back and retake Kokoda.
2/ The fall of Myola and the supply dump there stunned Brisbane. It occurred shortly after High Command had enquired when Maroubra force would start their offensive.
3/ The fall of Brigade Hill even with fresh 2/27th Battalion troops and the near loss of Head Quarters.
4/ Finally, the fall of Iorobawa with all of Eathers new Battalions.
These “shocks” were born out of a continuing ignorance and lack of appreciation of what was going on along the Track. High Command refused to understand and accept that Australian forces were outnumbered severely (6 to 1), outgunned (we had no mortars, artillery or heavy machine guns and the Japanese did), for a large part we had little supply of blankets, clothing, boots and socks (whereas the Japanese were well equipped), and finally the conditions of the Track were appalling.

While it is true that the fighting withdrawal of the 21st Brigade and the 39th and 53rd Militia had delayed the Japanese advance towards Port Moresby by nearly 2 months, and that they had simply ground Japanese forces into the ground by Iorobawa, events beyond the Kokoda theatre turned Horii’s forces back.

1/On the 7th August crack U.S. marines attacked the Solomon Islands at Guadalcanal. The Japanese needed a decisive victory here as they had been defeated at Milne Bay and Maroubra Force had slowed their progress towards Port Moresby. A Japanese victory in the Solomons was not to be.
2/Japanese supply boats and lines were being bombed on the north coast and Japanese High Command believed Buna and Gona were going to be attacked by Allied forces.

Horii was thus ordered to withdrawer to Buna and defend that coastal strong hold while keeping the Australian forces at bay in a strategic withdrawal much like Australia’s withdrawal.

Unknown to Australian forces that the Japanese had started their retreat, they awaited for their enemy at Imita Ridge. Several days passed with no sign of any Japanese.
On the 16th September the Composite 2/14th and 2/16th regained their independent identities. By the 26th September they were relieved of duty and were sent to Koitaki (near McDonalds Corner) for R+R.

The Japanese did not put up any resistance until Templeton’s Crossing and Eora Creek where they held up Australian Forces for 2 weeks. Horii did this as he sent many of his men back to Buna to help with reinforcing this strong hold.